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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16922

-vsMELVIN JAMES WORKMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Melvin James Workman, was charged
with rape, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-402 (1953), as amended, and aggravated burglary,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-203 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by the Honorable Ernest F.
Badlwin, Jr., sitting without a jury, and was found guilty of
rape and burglary in the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County.

Appellant was sentenced to serve an

indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years for both offenses, which sentence was to run
consecutively.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks af f irmance of the conviction
in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At trial, the State called several witnesses,
the most important of whom, for purposes of this brief
were Deana English, the victim, Catherine Workman,
defendant's mother, and Connie Riley, a friend of the
defendant.

Prior to the selection of the jury, which

had been called and was present in the courtroom,
appellant indicated his desire to be tried by Judge
Baldwin instead of a jury.
Deana English testified that on February 19,
1979, she was awakened at about 1:00 a.m. by a man who had
entered her apartment at 3378 South Fifth East.

The man

placed his hand over her mouth and told her that he had
a gun.

She was also told not to scream (Tr.15,18).

Almost immediately the man turned her on her stomach and
placed a pillow over her head.

The pillow was held there

by her assailant during the remainder of the assault.
After several attempts the victim was raped (Tr.23).
After the act of intercourse was completed the
victim began to scream.

Her assailant, upon hearing

-2-
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the screaming, ilt\Inediately left the apartment (Tr.23).
Deana English was unable to identify the appellant at
trial due to the fact that she did not have an opportunity
to see her assailant.

However, she testified that some ten

to fifteen minutes after her assailant left she observed a
wallet on the floor of her apartment.

She testified that

· this wailet was not hers, and that it did not belong in her
apartment, and that it was not in her apartment when she had
gone to bed (Tr.27,28).
Mrs. Catherine Workman, appellant's mother, was
called as a witness and identified the wallet and its
contents as belonging to appellant, Melvin Workman (Tr.152).
Connie Riley testified to three telephone conversation
she had had with the appellant, his mother, and his brother,
Jim Workman.

The last telephone conversation occurred around

7:30 a.m., February 19, 1979, and was initially between
Catherine Workman and Connie Riley (Tr.88,89).

Connie

Riley testified that during this conversation the telephone
was passed back and forth between appellant and his
mother.

During this conversation, Connie Riley was

informed that the appellant-had entered an apartment and
had raped a

woman~

The method used to accomplish the rape

was described, and she was also informed that money had

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been taken from a wallet in the living room, that a
flashlight had been dropped and later recovered, and
other facts which could only have been known by the
individual who had committed the rape {Tr.90-92).
At the conclusion of the State's case,
appellant elected not to put on evidence {Tr.175-177).
Prior to trial, however, appellant had duly filed a
notice of his intention to claim the defense of alibi.
In this notice, he indicated that. at the time of the rape
of Deana English he was at his residence with his mother,
and had been there from 11:30 p.m. on February 18, 1979,
until the following morning.

Catherine Workman, appellant's

mother, was listed as his alibi witness {R.48).

Mrs.

Workman was subpoenaed by the State and was available at
trial to so testify.
On October 18, 1979, appellant duly filed a motion
for disclosure of exculpatory material {R.50).

Pursuant to

this motion, on November 19, 1979, the State informed the
appellant of the following:
1.

That Kevin Mcclosky from the Center for Human

Toxicology had submitted a report which indicated that the
hair found in the bedsheets and pillow cases of the victim
was different from the hair taken from appellant's head.
A copy of the Mcclosky report was given to appellant's
counsel at that time.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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2.

That dirt taken from the clothing that

appellant said he was wearing at the time of the incident
was not similar to the dirt taken from the victim's
residence.
3.

That Mrs. Workman had called the Salt Lake

County Sheriff's Office and had reported that appellant
had been robbed in the parking lot of Devereaux's Bar and
that during the robberyhiswallet had been taken (R.58,59).
On May 8, 1979, a preliminary hearing was held
before the Honorable Robert Gibson, Circuit Court Judge.
At this hearing appellant called Virgil Johnson, the
Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff assigned to the investigation of this case.

During the questioning of Detective

Johnson, the appellant learned· that Connie Riley would be
called to testify at trial (Preliminary Hearing Transcript,·
77).

Appellant's counsel at the hearing was informed that

appellant admitted entering the victim's apartment, taking
money, and leaving his wallet in the apartment.

He was not

told of the circumstances surrounding the rape itself
{Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 78).

During the questioning

of Detective Johnson, appellant was also informed of the
following facts concerning .the case:
1.

That the victim indicated that the assailant

possibly had a beard.

-5-
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2.

The results of the analysis of the hair

taken by Kevin Mcclosky.
3.

That a second analysis had been made of the

hair samples by Peter Barnett of Forensic Science Associates
which indicated the hair to be similar to appellant's hair.
4.

That soil samples were taken from the victim's

residence and appellant's residence, that these soil samples
were compared with soil taken from appellant's clothing, and
that the results showed that the soil from appellant's clothing
was similar to soil taken from his own residence.
5.

That a timed run had been made between the

victim's residence and the appellant's residence.
6.

That the first telephone call received by

the Sheriff's Office from Mrs. Workman reporting the theft
of appellant's wallet was received at 1:14 a.m. on February
19' 1979.
· 7.

All physical evidence from the scene which

included a tank top and a piece of paper with the
defendant's telephone number on it (Preliminary Hearing
Transcript, 59-77).
Several weeks prior to trial, appellant's trial
counsel, Robert Van Seiver, and Deputy County Attorney Lynn
Payne, who prosecuted the case at trial, had a casual
conversation in the halls of the courts building.

To the
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best recollection of Mr. Payne, Mr. Van Seiver asked if
he (Mr. Van Sciver)"knew everything," and Mr. Payne told
him that he did know everything.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO DISCLOSE
APPELLANT'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS;
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
The law on the subject of when the withholding
of evidence by the prosecution denies a defendant due
process of law has been set down by the United States
Supreme Court, which has

enunciated the standard for

determining whether there has been a violation of due
process in a state's criminal prosecution.

In the

seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the defendant, prior to trial, had requested the
prosecution to allow him to examine a co-defendant's
extrajudicial statements.

Several statements were

shown to the defendant, but one, in which the codefendant admitted the actual killing, was withheld
by the prosecution and did not come to the attention
of the defense until after trial and after appeal.
The Supreme Court established in Brady the basic principle
that suppression of material evidence by the prosecution
which is favorable to an accused upon request violates
due
process.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court, in State v. Jarrell, Utah, 608 P.2d
218 (1980), described the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Brady as follows:
• . . the [United States Supreme] Court
held that the prosecutorial suppression of
evidence favorable to the accused, in the
face of a specific request for the evidence,
violates due process if the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment.
608 P.2d at 224 (emphasis added).

Central to a finding

of violation of due process in a case of prosecutorial
suppression of evidence under Brady, then, is the favorable
nature of the evidence to the accused.
In a more recent case, Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 897 (1972), the Supreme
Court reviewed the important elements of Brady and stated:
The heart of the holding in Brady is
the prosecution's suppression of evidence,
in the face of a defense production request,
where the evidence is favorable to the accused
and is material either to guilt or to punish· ment.
Important then, are a) suppression by
the prosecution after a request by the defense,
b) the evidence's favorable character for the
defense, and c) the materiality of the evidence.
These are the standards by which the prosecution's
conduct in Moore's case is to be measured.
408 U.S. at 794, 795 (emphasis added).
The case of United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976) extended the rulings of the Supreme Court in Brady and
Moore.

In Agurs, the Court held that a prosecutor has a

constitutional duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and evidence that is so clearly supportive of a claim of
innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty
to produce to the defense that which is unknown and unrequested
by the defense.

The Supreme Court held that due process

is violated if the undisclosed evidence would have, if
disclosed, created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's
guilt.

The Agurs Court further determined that whether

the evidence created a reasonable doubt must be evaluated
in light of the entire record as viewed by an appellate
court.

The proper standard of materiality of the undisclosed

evidence established by the Supreme Court in Agurs is that
if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt
that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed if it is suppressed.

Finally, if "

there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not
the additional evidence is considered, there is no
j ustif ica ti on for a new trial. "

42 7 U.S. at 112, 113.

Therefore, undisclosed evidence, to be considered material
and to thereby come within the ambit of Brady, Moore, and
Agurs, must be exculpatory.

Appellant's undisclosed

statements were inculpatory and the fact of their
nondisclosure did·not constitute a violation of due
process under the standards set forth by the United
States Supreme Court, particularly in the absence of a
showing that the suppressed evidence was favorable to the
accused.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This Court, in State v. Jarrell, supra, was
confronted with the issue of suppression of evidence by
the prosecution.

In Jarrell, the defendant's contention

was that two police reports withheld by the prosecution
contained information which would have tended to execulpate
him; allegedly, the reports would have been helpful for both
impeachment and cross-examination purposes.

The defendant

in Jarrell claimed that he did not become aware of the
existence of the police reports until after the trial, in
spite of the fact that both officers specifically referred
to the reports during their testimony.
the defendant's contention that

This Court rejected

the-~secution's

nondisclosure

of the police investigative reports rec}uired that the
defendant be granted a new trial.
Appellant characterizes this Court's decision in
Jarrell as resting most heavily on the fact of the absence of
any indication that the defendant sought discovery of the
police reports; appellant thereby leaves out the other
central factor relied on by this Court, that the reports
in question did not appear to raise a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt.

This Court held that not only is the

prosecutor not required to disclose all evidence which
might possibly be useful to the defense but which is not
likely to have a forseeable effect on the verdict, but that
generally,

evidence,~as

not been improperly withheld in a
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criminal proceeding if the defense has knowledge of such
evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it.
Because the undisclosed inculpatory evidence in no way
raised a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt,
appellant's claim that he was deprived of a fair trial
by the nondisclosure of his inculpatory statements
suffers from the same fatal flaw inherent in State v.
Jarrell, supra.
Several other Utah cases have recognized that to
vitiate a conviction on suppression of evidence grounds,
the evidence suppressed

must have tended to clear the

defendant and be exculpatory in nature; in other words,
that the evidence, if not suppressed, must

have tended to

establish the defendant's innocence, and that it would
have been helpful and not harmful to him if admitted at
trial.

Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957);

ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 (1961), cert.
den. 371 U. s. 872 (1962).
In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct,
this Court has stated:

"Error will not be presumed nor can

we presume misconduct on the part of counsel • . • • "

State

v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 at 771 (1949).

More-

over, this Court has repeatedly stated that great deference
will be given to the judgment of the trial court.

In State v.

Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974), this Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Due to his advantaged position and
consistent with his responsibilties as the
authority in charge of the trial, the inquiry
is necessarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court • • • Inasmuch
as this is his primary responsibility, when
he has given due consideration and ruled
upon the matter, this court on review should
not upset his ruling unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion.
517 P.2d at 1324.

This Court has in fact noted a

presumption, in non-jury cases, that the trial judge
disregards any improper material:
The court, sitting without a jury,
is presumed to have disregarded any
irrelevant, immaterial or other evidence
not pertinent to.the issue.
State v. Burke, 102 Utah 249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942).
In the instant case, where Judge Baldwin
denied appellant's motion for a mistrial, and where there
is no showing that the undisclosed evidence was exculpatory
and/or material, appellant was not denied due process, and
this Court should not upset the trial court's denial of
appellant's motion for a mistrial.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
APPELLANT'S INCULPATORY STATEMENTS AND
WAS NOT THEREBY DENIED A FAIR TRIAL,
PARTICULARLY WHERE HE HAD PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING THE ADMISSIONS.
In the case of State v. Moraine, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475
P.2d 831 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court held it was not error
ti

for the prosecuting attorney to fail to disclose in a bill
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of particulars admissions of the defendant concerning an
armed robbery.

In so doing the court seemed to indicate that

the defendant could not claim surprise where he had personal
knowledge concerning the admissions:
Where the court orders the prosecuting
attorney in a bill of particulars to give
matters not required by the statute, the
court may excuse the failure to furnish
such material by permitting the evidence
to be introduced, as was done in this case.
Besides, if anyone knew about the statement,
it surely was the defendant himself.
Id. at 833.

For a similar result see State v. Adams, Utah,

583 P.2d 89 (1978), wherein the defendant was not informed
of an admission made to a police officer:
In regard to defendant's final point:
That prejudicial error was committed because
the prosecution did not disclose to him that it
intended to use the testimony of Officer Reit
concerning defendant's admission, this is to be
said: We are in agreement with the proposition
that the prosecution is under an obligation to
treat the defendant fairly; and that it cannot
willfully suppress evidence favorable to him
for the purpose of obtaining evidence favorable
to him for the purpose of obtaining a conviction.
However, as will be seen from what has been said
above, there was no abuse of that principle. The
defendant and his counsel were aware of what had
happened; and there was no suppression of evidence
involved.
Id. at 91.

In the case of State v. Cook, Kan., 589 P.2d 616

(1979), the court.found that the trial judge did not commit

error in refusing to dismiss a case where the prosecutor had
failed to disclose exculpatory information.

In doing so the

court indicated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Moreover evidence not disclosed to
the defendant before trial is not suppressed
or withheld by the state if the defendant
has personal knowledge thereof, or if the
facts become available to him during trial
and he is not prejudiced in defending
against these new facts. . • The test in
these cases is whether the defendant's rights
were prejudiced.
In King v. Oklahoma, Okla., 586 P.2d 756 (1978),
cert. den. 440 U.S. 965 (1979), the prosecutor had told
the defense counsel that a witness would not be able to
identify the defendant.
identified the defendant.

When the witness testified, she
In holding that it was not error

to deny a motion for mistrial, the court said:
As his first assignment of error,
defendant alleges that the trial judge erred
by refusing to grant defendant's motion for
mistrial when Alice Lane identified the defendant
in court as one of the burglars.
Defendant
asserts that the prosecution had! in answer
to his question as to whether there would be
an in court identification, assured him there
would be none and that the resulting identification
was, therefore, surprise; and as a result counsel
for the defense was unprepared to counteract
the prejudicial effect of the identification,
thus severely impeding defense counsel in
representing defendant. . . Although the
positive identification at trial by Alice Lane
was an unexpected occurrence to defense counsel,
we do not deem such to come within the definition
of surprise. Witness Lane was endorsed upon the
information, thus giving counsel notice that
she would be testifying against the defendant.
It was counsel's responsibility to interview the
witnesses endorsed upon the information and to
discern the nature and extent of their testimony.
Over three months' time from the date of the
preliminary hearing until the date of trial was
available to counsel to discover the testimony
of Alice Lane.
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Id. at 958.

The appellant has claimed that the failure of
Detective Johnson and the prosecutor to inform him of
incriminating evidence was so prejudicial that appellant's
trial counsel was competely unprepared to discredit the witness
or rebut her testimony (Appellant's Brief, p. 16).

A review

of the record in this matter reveals nothing could be
further from the truth.

The appellant was aware of substantial!

all of the evidence presented at trial from the date of the
preliminary hearing (May 8, 1979).

At that time he knew or

should have known that the only issue at trial would be the
identity of the rapist.

He knew that the state's evidence

would include the fact that the wallet of the appellant was
found at the scene of the rape, that a piece of paper was
found at the scene of the rape which had the appellant's
telephone number on it, and that appellant had admitted to
Connie Riley that he had been in the apartment of the victim
at the time of the rape.

At preliminary hearing he also

knew that scientific tests had been taken on soil samples
taken from the victim's residence and from the appellant's
residence and that the appellant's hair had been compared
with hair left at the scene.

He knew the names of the

persons who condueted these tests and the results of each
test; some of which were favorable to the accused.

He also

knew that a report was made that his wallet had been taken

-15-
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from him in a robbery, which alleged theft was reported by
the appellant's mother some 10 to 15 minutes after the
assailant left

Deana English's apartment.

The record clearly reflects that the appellant
was aware of virtually all of the evidence that was
presented at trial some seven months in advance.

Very

few defendants have been so fully aware of the evidence
prior to trial.
This Court, in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778
{1980), made several observations about preliminary
hearings that are relevant.to this case:
(1)

That the prosecution is not required to

introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum
of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of the case to
the trier of fact.
(2)

That the fundamental purpose served by the

preliminary examination is to ferret out groundless arid
improvident prosecutions.
(3)

That the ancillary purposes of effectively

advising the defendant of the nature of the State's case
against him and of providing a discovery device in which
the defendant is able to discover and preserve favorable
evidence are also provided by the preliminary examination.
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Respondent submits that the prosecution established
sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the case to the
trial of fact, that the prosecution's case was neither
groundless nor improvident, appellant was provided through
the preliminary hearing with a discovery device enabling
him to discover and preserve favorable evidence, and
that he was informed at the preliminary hearing of the
nature of the State's case against him (see analysis,
supra).
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In effect, the appellant has contended that he
could not effectively deal with these disclosures because
he was surprised.

The case law in Utah has consistently

been that the defense cannot claim surprise from newly
discovered evidence where reasonable diligence would have
dislosed the information.

State v. Hawkins, 81 Utah 16,

16 P.2d 713 (1932); State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d
167 (1931).

In addition, this Court has recently determined,

in Anderson v. Bradley, Utah, 590 P.2d 339 (1979) that
surprise, as grounds for a new trial, is only that which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

In this

case appellant's trial counsel had more than seven months
to investigate after he became aware of the fact that the
appellant had admitted to being in the victim's apartment.
He was aware of all of the witnesses to the conversation
wherein defendant admitted to being in the apartment.

All

of the witnesses were available to be questioned prior to
trial.

Two of the witnesses (the appellant and Mrs. Workman)

were certainly sympathetic to the appellant.

Certainly it

was the obligation of appellant's trial counsel to question
those witnesses as to the entire conversation.
failed to do so.

He apparently

Now he cannot complain that he did not

find what he clearly could have found had he taken reasonable
steps to investigate.
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Additionally, prior knowledge of the appellant's
admission would not have put appellant in any better position
with respect to confronting the evidence presented.
testimony was that appellant had admitted a rape.

The
Three

witnesses, appellant, his brother, and his mother were
parties to telephone conversations with Mrs. Riley wherein
the rape was discussed.

Appellant's counsel could easily have

tested whether Mrs. Riley was telling the truth, since the
conversations either occurred as Mrs. Riley testified or
they did not.

All that appellant's trial counsel would have

had to do would have been to call appellant's mother, and
ask her whether she had had a conversation with Mrs. Riley
in which she (Mrs. Workman) told Mrs. Riley that appellant
had raped a woman.

Certainly appellant's mother could

testify as to whether she had ever made such a statement
about her son, and the evidence as presented could thereby
have been effectively dealt with.
The record in this case shows clearly that appellant
had knowledge of the fact that the state would introduce
evidence that Mrs. Riley talked to appellant within hours
of the rape.

Appellant knew that she would place him inside

the residence at tbe time of the rape.

Appellant had access

to at least two witnesses to that conversation, and his
failure to discover the entire conversation cannot be excused.

-19-
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In addition, appellant at trial had all the witnesses
available to him that were needed to deal effectively with
the admission.

Prior knowledge of the admission would not

have put appellant in any better position with regard to
confronting the evidence presented.

It cannot be alleged

that appellant's trial counsel could not effectively deal
with the testimony presented at trial by Mrs. Riley as to
appellant's confession.

Appellant not only had an effective

way to deal with this evidence, but he also had other
evidence available to him such as the alibi witness, the
hair and soil samples, and the reported robbery of the
wallet, which he chose not to present.

The decision not

to put on his defense was a calculated choice designed to
gain sympathy for appellant's position that he was denied
his defense.
POINT III
.APPELLANT MAY NOT AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE
BENEFIT OF CASE LAW DEALING WITH PROSECUTORIAL USE OF KNOWN FALSE TESTIMONY
AT TRIAL, OR WITH THE APPLICATION OF THE
DISCOVERY RULES OF RULE 16(a), FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BECAUSE OF
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THESE MATTERS TO
THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE.
Appellant characterizes the testimony of Detective
Johnson, given at the preliminary hearing, as false testimony
in that it did not allude to the circumstances of the rape
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itself.

Respondent contends that this testimony is,

at most, incomplete, and does not reach the level of
false testimony.

Instructive in this regard is the case

of Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), in
which the United States Supreme Court determined that
the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, did not
reach a witness' answer that was literally true, but
unresponsive, even assuming that the witness intends to
mislead the questioner by his answer, and even assuming
the answer is arguably false by negative implication.

The

Court determined that any special problems arising from
the literally true but unresponsive answer are to be
remedied not through a federal perjury prosecution but
through the questioner's acuity.

The Court stated:

Under the pressures and tensions of
interrogation, it is not uncommon for
the most earnest witness to give answers
that are not entirely responsive. Sometimes the witness does not understand
the question, or may in an excess of
caution or apprehension read too much
or too little into it . • • It is the
responsibility of the lawyer to probe;
testimonial interrogation, and crossexamination in particular, is a probing,
prying, pressing form of inquiry. 409
U.S. at 358.
Is also instructive that a vast majority of courts
which have considered the question have held that perjury or
false swearing cannot be based on a reply which, although
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incomplete, misleading, or unresponsive, is literally true
or technically accurate.

This rule is said to apply even

if the person who made the statement withheld purposely
part of the truth concerning the matter asked, or if for
devious reasons the statement was intentionally misleading,
or was shrewdly evasive, thereby conveying false information
by implication.

69 ALR 3d 993

(1976).

In the case of In re Rosoto, 112 Cal.Rptr. 641,
519 P.2d 1065 (1974) cert. den. 419 U.S. 897 (1974), the
California Supreme Court held that where a witness' answers
(in this case the witness was the chief investigator of the
district attorney) which are literally true may cause a
misleading impression due to the failure of counsel to ask
more specific questions, the witness may not be faulted for
failing to volunteer more explicit information, and the
witness' failure to volunteer testimony to avoid the misleading
impression does not constitute perjury, because the crucial
element of falsity is not present in his testimony.
Detective Johnson's answer to the question of
appellant's counsel was literally true, and contained no
element of falsity.

Further, appellant's trial counsel knew

that his client was charged with rape.

It would have been

a simple matter for him to follow up his question to Detective
Johnson with another question as to whether appellant had
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'

admitted the rape· to Mrs. Riley.

Appellant himself knew

what his statement to Mrs. Riley entailed.

He may not

now, at this late date, attempt to avail himself of those
cases dealing with deliberate deception of court and jury
by the prosecution through the knowing presentation of
false testimony, where there is no showing of the presentation by the prosecution of

known

false testimony.

A

brief summary of the principal cases cited by appellant
in this regard shows that they are inapposite to the instant
matter.
In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) a habeas
corpus petitioner charged that the State of California held
him in confinement without due process of law. He alleged
that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony,
knowingly used by the prosecution to obtain his conviction.
He also alleged that the prosecuting authorities deliberately
suppressed evidence which would have impeached and refuted
the testimony given against him (i.e. exculpatory evidence).
The Supreme Court held that due process cannot be deemed
satisfied if a state has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which is used as a means of depriving
a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of a
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be
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perjured.

The facts in Mooney are easily distinguished

from those of the instant case.

Here, there was no perjured

testimony presented by the prosecution either at the preliminary
hearing or at trial.

The information allegedly suppressed

was inculpatory in nature, and, at trial there was no
suppression of any evidence whatsoever by the prosecution.
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the
Supreme Court determined that a conviction obtained through
the use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives
of the State is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that the same result obtains when the State, not having
solicited false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when
it appears.

In the instant case, there was no false evidence

presented by the prosecution, therefore the prosecution was
not guilty of allowing false evidence to go uncorrected.
In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
the defense counseldiscovered subsequent to trial that the
Government at trial failed to disclose

an alleged promise

of leniency made to its key witness in return for his
testimony.

The Assistant United States Attorney who presented

the case to the grand jury admitted that he promised the
witness that he (the witness) would not be prosecuted if he
testified before the grand jury and at trial.

The Assistant

Attorney General who tried the case was unaware of the
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promise.

At trial, the informant flatly denied the existence

of any such agreement.

The Court held that the prosecution's

duty to present all material evidence to the

~

was not

fulfilled by the nondisclosure, and that therefore due process
was violated.

In the instant case, there was no false

testimony given either at the prelirainary hearing or at the
trial, therefore Giglio is completely distinguishable on its
facts from the instant matter.
Appellant's attempted reliance on the case of
United States v. Pascual, 606 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1979) is
also inappropriate, partic11larly in light of the facts of
the instant case.

In Pascual, the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, in particular Rule 16(a), were operative and
applicable; in the instant matter they were not.

The

magistrate in Pascual entered a standing discovery order;
in appellant's case, no standing discovery order was entered.
Finally, the decision in Pascual was dependent not only on
the fact of non-disclosure of the defendant's letter in
violation of Rule 16(a), but also on the fact that defendant's
letter incriminated two co-defendants by name where nothing
in the record showed that they had knowledge of the letter
prior to its presentation at trial.

Appellant knew of his

own statement, and it affected only himself.
In United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.
1976) cert. den. 429 U.S. 924 (1976), the Court of Appeals
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for the District of Columbia had occasion to interpret
pertinent provisions of Rule 16(a).

The court determined

that under rule 16(a), which allows defendants to inspect
and copy or photograph any relevant written or recorded
statements or confessions made "by the defendant" within
the possession, custody or control of the Government, the
phrase "by the defendant" requires not that the statement
at issue be attributed to the defendant, but that the
statement be obtained by the Government directly from
the defendant without intervention of any third party.
Under this interpretation, even if Rule 16{a) were applicable
in

the instant matter, appellant's undisclosed confession

would not fall under its protection, as his statement was
not obtained by the state directly from him, but was obtained
through Mrs. Riley.
The case of State v. Hiteshaw,

Ore., 476 P.2d 935

(1970), is also inapplicable to the instant case, particularly
because in

Hiteshaw

not only was there a written discovery

order requiring the state to explicitly disclose the defendant's
admissions, but there was also evidence of trickery on the
part of police officers in getting the admissions from the
defendant to convict him.

Here, there was no written discovery

order, nor was there any misconduct in getting the appellant's
confession.
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Finally, petitioner's reliance on State v. Brown,
Idaho, 560 P.2d 880 (1977) is misplaced, in light of the
recent decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Horn,
Idaho, 610 P.2d 551 (1980) that the prosecutor is only
required to disclose information favorable to the defendant
and material to either defendant's guilt or punishment in
a criminal prosecution.
CONCLUSION
~ppellant

made no showing that he was prejudiced

by the alleged failure of the prosecution to disclose his
confession under standards enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court and by this Court, due process is not violated
by the failure of the prosecution to disclose a defendant's
inculpatory statements, particularly where the defendant has
personal knowledge of the statements and is not prejudiced
thereby.
For these reasons, respondent prays that this
Court affirm the conviction of appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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